On Governance: Authority and Order III
Part 3: Individual vs Collective
Part 3 of 5. This analysis of social structures and historical governance models assumes familiarity with democratic failures outlined in Part 1]and Part 2. The contemporary applications and policy recommendations in parts 4 and 5 rest on these historical foundations. New readers should begin with Part 1 to follow the complete reasoning. If you are new to my writing, you may also want to read my disclaimer about my thoughts.
Series
Part 1: The Evolution of Authority
Part 2: The Illusion of Choice
Part 3: Individual vs Collective
Part 4: Models of Guided Governance (coming soon)
Part 5: Rethinking Progress and Success (coming soon)
Social Harmony
Before we examine historical examples, it’s worth taking the time to question whether the individualistic philosophy underlying liberal democratic theory is actually beneficial for human success. The assumption that maximising individual choice leads to better collective results is so deeply embedded in Western thought that we rarely examine the accumulating evidence against it, all while researchers from other cultural backgrounds have long questioned this premise.
Let’s consider the mental health patterns in highly individualistic societies compared to more collectively orientated ones. The US, which has elevated personal freedom to near-cultish status, leads the developed nations in anxiety disorders, depression, and the rate of taking one’s own life, according to World Health Organisation data. Americans are more likely to die alone, report fewer close friendships, and express lower life satisfaction despite almost unparalleled material wealth compared to countries with stronger collective orientations. This isn’t a coincidence but a predictable result of what Japanese psychologist Shinobu Kitayama calls “independent self-construal,” which atomises society into competing individuals rather than fostering cooperative communities.
Self-construal denotes how people define themselves in relation to others, particularly in relation to whether they see themselves as individuals separate from others or as persons whose identities are formed through relationships and group membership. Independent self-construal forms individuals who don’t accept external influence and are more likely to double down on their identity when feeling threatened. They become psychologically invested in appearing superior and self-sufficient, which can make vulnerability and seeking help appear a threat to whom they perceive themselves to be. Instead of reaching out, they withdraw and reinforce their separateness, isolating themselves—which is precisely the opposite behaviour from what would help them.
Conversely, interdependent self-construal, which involves relationship-building and mutual support, raises self-esteem and resilience. Independent self-construal at the most basic level rewires how people see their relationship to others and embeds social separation at the deepest psychological level. It becomes self-perpetuating across all interactions. In essence, individualistic societies cultivate dispositions that undermine the very social bonds required for mental wellbeing. Isolation masquerades as personal strength. When everyone is encouraged to “follow their own path” and “be their authentic self”, the shared norms that make community life possible begin to break down, and social fragmentation occurs, following naturally from excessive individualism. We see it especially in declining marriage rates, weaker family structures, declining birth rates, and nebulised families.
Decades of empirical research support this connection between social structure and psychological outcomes. The Harvard Study of Adult Development, conducted over 80 years, and similar longitudinal research consistently corroborate the concept that social connections are among the most powerful predictors of both mental and physical health.
”It’s the longest in-depth longitudinal study on human life ever done, and it’s brought us to a simple and profound conclusion: Good relationships lead to health and happiness. The trick is that those relationships must be nurtured. We don’t always put our relationships first. Consider the fact that the average American in 2018 spent 11 hours every day on solitary activities such as watching television and listening to the radio. Spending 58 days over 29 years with a friend is infinitesimal compared with the 4,851 days that Americans will spend interacting with media during that same time period.”
—Robert Waldinger and Marc Schulz on The Harvard Study of Adult Development
Research spearheaded by Robert Putnam shows that collective orientations provide what psychologists call “stress buffering”—when people have strong social bonds and community connections, the same kinds of stress produce significantly less psychological damage. Cross-cultural studies demonstrate that relationship-rich societies report higher life satisfaction even at lower income levels. Individualistic societies face rising loneliness, which is now being recognised as a public health crisis in many countries. There is a dialectical relationship here: collective structures create better mental health, and better mental health produces more functional and cooperative societies. These stable, resilient collective societies benefit from higher social trust and more effective problem-solving abilities. Thus, individualism’s emphasis on self-reliance undermines the very social connections human wellbeing depends on.
Further, the economic consequences are equally damaging in market-orientated systems. Individual freedom in modern liberal markets has produced striking wealth inequality. People are told they are free to succeed, yet drown in personal debt. The average person in these systems is directed, and expected, to navigate complex financial decisions they have been utterly unprepared for, from mortgage terms to pension plans, while being blamed for their inevitable failures. Rather than liberation, it could be labelled entrapment. In contrast, economists like Ha-Joon Chang and Felwine Sarr detail how developmental states in East Asia and community-based economic systems in parts of Africa provide economic security through collective responsibility rather than individual risk-bearing. Many individual societies often overlook the essential truth of humans: they are inherently social creatures that derive meaning from a sense of belonging and purpose, from contributing to something larger than themselves. Without social responsibility, individual freedom creates isolation and anxiety.
A governmental concept to consider may best be described as institutional paternalism: governance by institutions designed to promote long-term social welfare rather than short-term individual preferences. Think of models similar to what has been implemented in Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew. Authority rests in proven systems and expertise, rather than solely in the whims of a single leader, while also not relying on the laissez-faire Western-style democracy wherein most people most of the time don’t have the knowledge, perspective, or incentive to make decisions that benefit society as a whole. Like supportive parents, such systems sometimes have to say no to what people want in order to provide them what they actually need.
Historical Examples
Contrary to the consensus among Western universities, governance systems that are characterised by centralised authorities and institutional continuity have in actuality consistently produced more stable and prosperous societies throughout history, compared to libertarian or representative democratic alternatives. Admittedly, democracy’s history is relatively short by comparison—which itself raises questions about its longevity as we see systemic tensions rear their ugly heads in contemporary American and European contexts. However, when we examine why these earlier systems eventually transformed or collapsed, their strengths and limitations become perspicuous.
Let’s briefly examine the Roman Empire. The Romans maintained unity and prosperity for centuries through governance that evolved into increasingly centralised authority, infrastructure, complex legal systems, and trade networks that lasted long after political collapse. It was not simply military might that made Rome successful, but administrative competence. Roman bureaucrats understood that governance was a craft that required expertise, and was not merely a popularity contest. However, as historian Chris Wickham demonstrates, the Empire’s decline began when this administrative competence dissolved due to ever-growing rigidity, fiscal pressure, and the inability to adapt to changing military technologies and barbarian migration. Yet, Byzantine historian John Halton reveals why the Byzantines, or Eastern Roman Empire, succeeded where the West failed: rather than succumbing to administrative sclerosis, Byzantium maintained institutional flexibility. It reformed its military structure, adapted its financials mechanisms to face the new reality, and preserved the essential craft of governance that had originally built the mighty Rome. Where the Roman Empire’s bureaucracy became static and brittle, the Byzantine Empire’s evolved.
Progressively complex administration combined with economic pressure, religious (and by extension social) change, and ill preparedness for natural disasters, without reasonable safeguards in place, allowed power to naturally decentralise which created competition, power vacuums, and widespread corruption. Typically centralised systems maintain institutional knowledge and technical competence across generations, while decentralised governance such as contemporary Western democracy suffer from fast-paced electoral turnover that disrupts administrative expertise. The efficiency of consolidated authority and decision-making enabled Rome to instigate large-scale infrastructure projects and alacritous military responses, avoiding the delays inherent to building democratic consensus. The emerging factors that caused the decline of the Western Roman Empire (i.e., fiscal irresponsibility, institutional rigidity, inability to adapt) are more prevalent in democratic systems due to short-term thinking, populist policies, and political gridlock. As Rome became more bureaucratically strict, power became less centralised, and these factors prevent necessary but unpopular adaptations, and even progress.
The Byzantine Empire survived for a thousand years precisely because its centralised governance and imperial institutions provided the stability and continuity needed to withstand the constant external pressures to which Rome eventually succumbed. The empire faced relentless challenges—Arab conquests, Crusader attacks, Turkish invasions, recurring plagues, and economic competition—yet its effective administrative systems enabled it to adapt and endure where other medieval states collapsed. The empire’s eventual fall in 1453 wasn’t due to authoritarian dysfunction but to geographical vulnerability and the cumulative drain on resources from centuries of defensive warfare. When historians point to “economic decline,” they’re describing how external pressures forced the loss of Anatolian tax bases to Turkish conquest and trade control to Italian maritime republics. Social fragmentation was caused by increasing tensions between classes and religious groups, tensions exacerbated by the constant strain of warfare and resource scarcity, and these factors were consequences, not causes, of the external pressures that ultimately overwhelmed even Byzantium’s robust governmental framework. Some historians argue, though at a stretch, that the empire may not have truly collapsed but transformed; the Ottomans adopted many Byzantine administrative practices, legal traditions, and governmental structures, after all.
Even the Mongol Empire, despite its military origins, succeeded through adopting sophisticated administrative systems from conquered territories while maintaining them through centralised oversight. Their postal system connected Europe to Asia, trade networks created unprecedented economic prosperity, and legal codes adapted local customs while maintaining imperial authority, preserving Chinese administrative methods, Persian cultural achievements, and Islamic scholarly traditions while adding innovations in military organisation and communication. Mongol scholar David Morgan and Persian historian Bertold Spuler establish how this system’s decline came when the empire grew too large for medieval communication technology and when successor states chose isolation over adaptation, revealing the challenge of maintaining responsiveness across vast territories without modern technology.
For our final example, we look at the fact that the scholarly bureaucracy of Imperial China is the most enduring government system in history, lasting over three millennia. Chinese historians often emphasise the fact that three thousand years of dynasties survived precisely because of the constant adaptation, showing how centralised systems are not the static persistence that critics argue it to be. The Mandate of Heaven (the doctrine that holds that Heaven chooses rulers based on moral virtue, not hereditary right alone) provided legitimacy, but the examination system is what ensured that administrators possessed actual competence.
The imperial examination system was a method for picking government officials based on merit rather than birth. Candidates have their knowledge and writing skills tested, and higher levels of governance (local, provincial, metropolitan) had progressively more difficult tests. Candidates who successfully completed exams could potentially obtain government positions regardless of their social strata, which supported the Mandate of Heaven’s emphasis on virtuous rule over nobility, moral cultivation over mere hereditary privilege. And so, this created a relatively competent and literate bureaucracy which could effectively govern a sprawling empire. The examination system is still in use today in an evolved form, and while we can say imperialism may have collapsed in China, the nation itself survived near-disintegration and is still standing strong today. When functioning and adaptable, the examination system produces notable stability, prosperity, and technological advancement.
While these systems eventually transformed or collapsed, their periods of stability and prosperity lasted far longer than any democratic experiments to date. Analysing these cases, we can see that the consistent fatal flaw among them was a growing obstinance in the face of toil necessitating adaptation. Inflexibility was ultimately the nail in the coffin for empires that spanned from hundreds to even thousands of years. Rome lasted five centuries as a unified empire, China’s dynastic system over three millennia with periodic renewals, Byzantium over a thousand years. Even their periods of decline often maintained more social order and cultural continuity than contemporary democratic transitions manage, though as historians from these societies note, such stability often came at significant costs in terms of social mobility and individual autonomy.
Contemporary examples also reinforce these patterns. International interventions imposing democratic transitions in Iraq and Libya created chaos, sectarian violence, and humanitarian disasters that continue today. At the same time, China’s developmental approach under the Communist Party has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty while maintaining social stability. Rwanda’s post-genocide recovery under Paul Kagame reveals how institutional leadership can rebuild a society that fragmented democratic competition may have left vulnerable. His reign has notably been underscored by significant economic growth, improvements in social conditions, a focus on peace and reconciliation, women’s empowerment, and investment into IT.
It should be noted, however, that contemporary authoritarian systems face the same fundamental challenge that the aforementioned historical examples encountered: maintaining responsiveness to changing circumstances. Chinese political scientist Yu Keping acknowledges that even successful developmental states must eventually address questions of political participation and accountability. The lesson isn’t that authoritarian systems are perfect, but that competent, institutionalised authority can produce better outcomes than unguided popular governance when properly designed and implemented, especially with strong safeguards and feedback mechanisms in place (for example, Singapore’s community feedback sessions or Russia’s annual direct line to the president).
Look out for the fourth part of this five-part series coming soon.
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