On Governance: Authority and Order II
Part 2: The Illusion of Choice
Part 2 of 5. This section analyses information control and democratic theatre, building on the voter psychology critique established in Part 1. The historical examples and alternative models discussed in Parts 3-5 depend on understanding these foundational mechanisms. Reading out of sequence undermines the cumulative argument. Start with Part 1 If you are new to my writing, you may also want to read my disclaimer about my thoughts.
Series
Part 1: The Evolution of Authority
Part 2: The Illusion of Choice
Part 3: Individual vs Collective (coming soon)
Part 4: Models of Guided Governance (coming soon)
Part 5: Rethinking Progress and Success (coming soon)
Manufactured Consent
This “illusion of knowledge” is exacerbated by what American scholars Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman denominate as “manufactured consent”: the fastidious manipulation of public opinion through control over the media. Their 1988 book argues that market-based democratic systems filter information through media companies with wealthy owners, advertisers whose revenue pressures shape content, and government sources that set agendas. They don’t serve the common people but the elite. Further, pressure from potentially negative responses creates a broad filter for data. Companies threaten to pull funding or start lawsuits. Governments launch lengthy investigations or tauten regulations. Well-funded organisations churn out studies and so-called experts to parry unfavourable narratives. We also have good old-fashioned boycotts, protests, and incited (or manufactured) revolutions. With these kinds of overhanging threats, media outlets often censor themselves without any need for laws to mandate them to do so. American media critic Ben Bagdikian documented how the United States consolidated media from 50 dominant firms in 1983 to a mere six by 2000; simultaneously, comparable patterns emerged across Western market economies. Research by British scholars James Curran and Jean Seaton shows how advertising dependencies systematically exclude perspectives that challenge consumer capitalism in the United Kingdom.
However, scholars from other contexts question whether this market-based filtering axiomatically bears worse outcomes than the alternatives. It has been argued by Chinese media scholar Wang Hui that coordinated systems can actually reduce the contradictory message that impedes effective governance. Singapore’s founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew asserted that unrestrictive information competition during development phases can create social instability, which ultimately harms collective welfare.
Yet another long-lasting filter that information passes through includes what Chomsky and Herman describe as “anti-ideology”. This sort of framework ensures that some perspectives are seen as natural and reasonable, while others are not, which renders opposition either invisible or extremist. And when ideas fall outside of the realm of acceptability, they don’t need to be censored, as they are not regarded as newsworthy or a serious perspective (the exception to these rules being so-called “rage bait” and “clickbait”). What was once potentially a worthy discussion or debate becomes polarised “us vs them” mindsets which pit people against each other and propagate informational noise. This process can be found in the concept of cultural hegemony, written about extensively by Italian Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci, which explains how the ruling classes maintain control through not just the economy and governance but also through culture, ideology, and everyday common sense. “Acceptable discourse” creates the illusion of debate while de facto narrowing actual discussion to fall within predetermined boundaries.
Government-run systems operate through different filtering mechanisms, but the key insight remains: all information systems concentrate control somewhere. The question isn’t whether filtering occurs, but rather whether those doing the filtering succour the broader population or the narrow elite interests. Market systems distribute control among private actors with their agenda, while state systems potentially align information management with collective rather than commercial interests.
Russian political theorist Vladislav Surkov’s concept of “sovereign democracy” argues that information sovereignty is essential for state sovereignty and protection against foreign manipulation. The system itself maintains democratic structures, such as elections, parliament, and media. But it ensures these operate within boundaries that preserve state control and prevent foreign-directed political interference. Rather than prioritising blocking access to foreign media, the system instead creates competing information ecosystems so as to ensure that domestic perspectives aren’t overwhelmed by foreign explication. Homegrown platforms elevate local sources, and foreign media is mandated to be transparent about its alignment and funding. This framework recognises that populations will inevitably access diverse sources of information, so it becomes important instead to make sure that domestic institutions and perspectives remain credible and competitive while maintaining global information exchange. Blocking is a last resort used for content deemed illegal, harmful, or extremist, and the government is largely transparent about the framework.
In many Western democracies, such as those in the EU, UK, and US, thousands of domains are blocked each year for content that is also deemed illegal, harmful, or extremist. Individuals are banned on social media platforms, posts are moderated, and platforms are blocked. The EU prohibited access to Russian state-sponsored media across all member states, including online platforms and apps, and the UK revoked the licence of Chinese news network China Global Television Network (CGTN) and that of Iranian state broadcaster Press TV’s English-language outlet. Concurrently, the US ordered CGTN America and TRT World’s Washington outlet to register as foreign agents under their Foreign Agent Registration Act of 1938. However, it has interestingly not required other state-funded media (a criterion for being registered as a foreign agent), such as BBC, France24, or Deutsche Welle, to register as foreign agents, suggesting these laws can sometimes be based on the rationale of geopolitical motivation rather than purely based on concerns about “state propaganda”.
As we can see, Western democracies have also recognised the importance of information and narrative control, particularly when it comes to countries they deem adversarial. As early as October 2025, the European Union is proposing to implement “Chat Control” legislation which would require all messaging platforms, such as WhatsApp, Signal, and Telegram, to scan all user content, including texts, images, and videos, regardless of whether it’s encrypted. 19 EU states back the proposal. In the recent past, it was brought to light that the NSA currently conducts worldwide data collection and stores billions of records per day. They collect almost all telephone calls made within the US and mammoth amounts of internet data.
Contrary to the “free speech” framing used to obscure the fact, blocking and censorship also frequently occur within democratic and liberal institutions, demonstrating the importance of maintaining control over the narrative of a population and its exposure to content deemed undesirable to its government. Now we can clearly see that modern liberal democracies, while touting freedom and liberty to its citizens, engage in the same subversive and paternalistic practices of which they accuse political competitors.
Democratic Theatre
The theatre of modern democracy encourages people to believe that they’re exercising meaningful choice, when in actuality they are being guided by an invisible hand towards predetermined outcomes. Consider, for example, the United States, wherein the political parties are split into a two-party system that exploits these tribal “us vs them” and “if he’s not with us, he’s against us” mentalities. Artificial divisions conveniently distract from elite self-interests while allowing citizens to feel politically engaged by rage-baited propaganda, despite being fundamentally ignorant of the realities of governance. This pattern is noticeably different among democratic models, from multi-party parliamentary systems to proportional representation to single-party developmental models. Yet, each system creates its own mechanism for managing popular participation while maintaining elite control. Chinese scholar Wang Shaoguan contends that Western-style electoral competition also produces policy instability that impedes long-term planning. Many Western democracies prioritise short-term election cycles of substantive governance outcomes.
It is apparent that these systems, particularly those of the US, do not reflect true democratic participation but rather a sophisticated form of population management, where people are enslaved by those who exploit their primitive dopamine cravings. From Silicon Valley social media platforms, Hollywood and London entertainment industries, and consumer culture among the fashion capitals and automotive industries to online witch-hunts orchestrated through Twitter and Facebook, and Netflix binge sessions on a genuine leather couch with a 4K Samsung smart TV. Do these indulgences nurture an informed and rational population?
Another intriguing observation to be made is found in the critiques of EU officials and US policymakers of systems in Russia, China, Iran, and other non-aligned states, when viewed under the allegorical microscope. For instance, as previously mentioned, EU member states and the UK restrict access to Russian and Chinese media outlets while maintaining access to BBC, Deutsche Welle, and CNN, and then condemn those very countries for reciprocal restrictions. Asymmetrical information control like this often flies under the radar of the average person in Western countries. Transparency issues are magnified by the fact that organisations such as Freedom House and Transparency International are oft cited as objective measures of freedom and governance quality. Natheless, the former is headquartered in Washington DC and funded primarily by the US State Department, while the latter is based in Berlin and funded largely by European governments and American foundations. These institutions would naturally and understandably favour familiar systems. They would find it difficult to extricate their inherent Anglo-American and European values and biases from their assessments, particularly from the criteria itself. Yet, many of the sources cited in English-language and European academic literature on democracy and governance are, in fact, based most typically in the US, UK, Germany, and other NATO member countries. Thus, when researchers from Harvard, Oxford, and the London School of Economics measure “successful outcomes” through GDP metrics developed by the World Bank, freedom defined by Washington-based think tanks, or governance indicators created by London and New York institutions, they create a circular logic that inevitably validates their own systems. All the while systematically devaluing the alternative approaches to political organisation found in China’s developmental state model, Singapore’s managed democracy, or traditional consensus-based governance systems across Africa and indigenous communities worldwide.
Look out for the third part of this five-part series coming soon.
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